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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of newspapers provision for political
opinion. I empirically examine the role of newspapers political preferences and
market competition on newspapers decision to make endorsements. Regression
results suggest that market competition turns newspapers more likely to make
endorsements. Results from a simple model show that newspapers ideology de-
termine their endorsements, making partisan papers more likely to make political
recommendations and endorse challengers than non-partisan newspapers.
1 Introduction
Political endorsements have an important role in American elections. They a¤ect
voters perceptions about candidates (Knight and Chiang 2011; Ladd and Lenz 2009)
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and candidates vote share (Leon 2013). This paper investigates the determinants of
newspapers provision of political endorsements by focusing on two main issues: market
structure and newspapers political preferences. Understanding these relationships is
important for policy issues. Historically, public e¤orts, such as the Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act, have been undertaken in response to the decline of newspapers circulation to
ensure diversity (Busterna and Piccard 1993). The Newspaper Preservation Act autho-
rized the formation of joint operating agreements (JOAs) among competing newspapers
operating within the same market area to help newspapers reduce their operating costs.
While JOAs allowed newspapers to combine business operations (e.g., advertising and
circulation), they were required to maintain separate news operations and editorial sec-
tions to decide, for example, political endorsements. Despite such e¤orts, it is likely that
newspapers level of political activism is a response to market incentives, as described
below by The Times Magazine (2008):
At the time when newspapers are trying to ensure their survival by at-
tracting young readers, the idea of endorsements is both counterproductive
and an anachronism. . . in doing so newspapers are undermining the very
basis of their business, which is impartiality. The Times Magazine (2008)
More broadly, this paper contributes to a body of work that investigates newspapers
political preferences and how these reect onto media reports (Puglisi and Snyder 2015,
2011; Larcinese et al. 2011; Knight and Chiang 2011; Di Tella and Franceschelli 2011;
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Ansolabehere et al 2006), and how market structure shapes
the media (Cage 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Kim 2008; Chiang 2007).
As discussed above, newspapers political endorsements are relevant in elections and
interesting by themselves. More generally, they are a good case study to overcome mea-
surement challenges and to understand the relationship between newspapers provision
of political opinion and market competition. Firstly, endorsements represent a clear
stand in favour of a candidate. Secondly, during elections, newspapers face an identical
opportunity to take a stand. Therefore, their choice set is observable, as opposed to news
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that is determined by a random occurrence of events and is thus unobservable to read-
ers until reported. Measuring the correlation between competition and a newspapers
reporting practice is also challenging. Newspapers face a di¤erent set of competitors in
di¤erent geographical areas, while news itself is supposed to reach all newspaper read-
ers. Political endorsements are tailored messages for a subset of readersnamely, those
who live in a particular political jurisdiction. This feature allows one to test whether
and how the level of competition a newspaper faces in an electoral jurisdiction corre-
lates with its behaviour. As I will further develop in Section 3, I expect a relationship
between newspapers political endorsements and market competition. Market structure
correlates with newspapers characteristics, such as ideological positioning (Gentzkow
and Shapiro 2010; Chiang 2007) and politicians behaviour (Snyder and Stromberg
2010). As a result this will determine newspapers evaluation of candidates and, hence,
their endorsements.
To identify the association between market competition and newspapers likelihood
of making endorsements, I collected information on demographics and the newspaper
industrys structure at the county level, and transform those to the level of newspaper-
jurisdiction. I then constructed a variable that is the fraction of the political jurisdiction
in which a newspaper operates as a monopolist, and I test how this variable correlates
with the likelihood of an endorsement. Variations in the data enabled me to compare
endorsement behaviour across areas where newspapers face a di¤erent degree of com-
petition, holding constant politicians behaviour, readership, and newspapers intrinsic
characteristics. Hence, I was able to circumvent and separate confounding e¤ects re-
garding measurement of the impact of market structures on newspaper behaviour, such
as the selection of politicians that run for election in di¤erent jurisdictions, or charac-
teristics of newspapers that are established or determine local market structures. This
strategy di¤ers from previous studies that explore the entry and exit of newspapers
in markets (Cage 3013, Chiang 2007), or those that compare reports of newspapers
located in cities with di¤erent market structures (Entman 1985), to identify the e¤ects
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of market competition on newspaper behaviour.1
I nd that market competition does correlate with newspapers endorsement prac-
tices. Several channels contribute di¤erently to this association. Newspapers that
circulate in monopolistic areas (and possibly determine local market structure) are in-
herently more likely to make endorsements. However, an analysis within a newspaper
across jurisdictions provides weak evidence that newspapers behave as if they prioritize
making endorsements in areas where they face more market competition. The ndings
of this paper suggest that market competition can make newspapers more active in
making political endorsements. These results are relevant in light of the current change
in the newspaper industry structure due to the nancial crisis and bankruptcy of many
city papers (Kirchho¤ 2010).
In the second part of this paper, I conduct a di¤erent and separate analysis address-
ing the question of whether and to what extent newspapers ideological preferences a¤ect
endorsement behaviour. Previous studies have used endorsements to identify newspa-
pers political slants (Kim 2008; Knight and Chiang 2011; Larcinese et al. 2011). This
paper provides a novel model that quanties how newspapers preferences a¤ect their
political endorsements. After estimating these preferences, I conduct counterfactuals
to understand newspapers trade-o¤s between candidate characteristics and how their
political preferences translate to their likelihood of making endorsements. I developed
a two-stage model that explains, sequentially, the newspapers decisions in research-
ing candidates and announcing an endorsement, and then, the choice of whom to en-
dorse. I consider an environment where newspapers are characterized by a political
orientationleft-wing, neutral or right-wingand only make informed endorsements.
The newspapers decisions in researching candidates in a race takes into consideration
endorsements costs and the (expected) valuation of candidates characteristics (i.e.,
1Cage (2013) nds that more newspapers in a market are associated with fewer news articles and
lower information provision. Chiang (2007) nds that newspaper competition reduces the frequency
of ideological extreme individuals to obtain political news online. Etman (1985) nds modest e¤ects
of competition in terms of diversity of newspapers content.
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incumbency and ideological alignment with the newspaper and its readership in the
jurisdiction). The model is estimated using endorsement choices from 90 American
newspapers over 154 races in the 2002 and 2006 elections.
The results are consistent with the view that newspapers are politically oriented:
they take their political preferences into consideration when choosing their endorse-
ments. This in turn makes partisan papers at least 25% more likely to declare endorse-
ments than non-partisan papers. The estimated parameters indicate that political
alignment between the candidate and the newspaper is a more valuable characteristic
to explain the endorsement choice than the political alignment of the candidate with
the jurisdiction readership. This nding is more consistent with the supply-led view
of media bias, than the demand-driven view. In addition, the estimates detect that
left-wing papers (as opposed to right-wing papers) are those that most value their own
political alignment with candidates when deciding whom to endorse. One important
implication of this asymmetry of preferences is that newspapers political orientations
are predictors for the quality of their endorsed candidates.
This paper proceeds in ve sections. Section Two explains the data and the con-
structed measure of the degree of competition faced by newspapers at the jurisdiction
level. Section Three documents the association between the likelihood of endorsements
and market competition. Section Four describes the structural model of endorsement,
and presents its results. Section Five concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Background and Sources
Political endorsements are located in the editorial or opinion-editorial section of a
newspaper. The editorial section contains the institutional opinion of the newspaper,
representing its voice for endorsing candidates, taking a stance on issues, criticizing
o¢cial decisions, and commenting on events. The editorial board decides what and
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whom the newspaper endorses (Meltzer 2007).
This study explains the political endorsement choices of 90 American daily news-
papers in electoral races for the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, State
Governor, Secretary of State, State Attorney General, and the State Senate in 2002 and
2006. In total, 154 electoral races were considered. For each newspaper, endorsement
choices were observed in up to twenty-ve political races. These are listed in the Ap-
pendix.The chosen newspapers were from seven states - California, Florida, Michigan,
Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Wisconsin - comprised of 658 counties.
The newspaper sample met two criteria. First, the newspapers all report to the
Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC),2 hence data about their circulation is available.
Most American newspapers do not follow an endorsement practice (Phoenix Discourse
2008). Since this study aimed at identifying newspapers incentives for making endorse-
ments, the second criteria to be in the sample is that each newspaper made at least one
endorsement in any race of the 2002 or 2006 elections. To be more condent that the
remaining sample (of non-endorsement papers) did not follow an endorsements practice,
I made phone calls to 10% of them and all conrmed this information. Furthermore,
the choice of these seven states was based on the representativeness of newspapers au-
dited by the ABC, which represents around 30% of the total newspapers within these
seven states. In the remaining states, the ABCs sample represents around 20% of the
total newspapers. (Note that representativeness is crucial to this analysis in order to
properly identify market structure.)
I collected information on endorsements from Lexis, Newsbank databases, and news-
paper websites. The remaining data consists of candidate and newspaper characteris-
tics, cross-sections of readership demographics and political leanings, and measures of
newspaper reader share and market competition within a county. Candidate charac-
teristics were collected from the Election Divisions of the Secretaries of State. Census
characteristics (such as race, total population, income, and level of urbanization) were
collected from the Census Bureau at the county level. These are a proxy for newspaper
2The ABC is currently known as Alliance for Audited Media (AAM).
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readership. (The composition of newspaper readership is not observable at the county
level. I assume that county population is representative of the readership composition
at this level.)
To identify a countys political leanings, I used the two-party vote share to John
Kerry in the 2004 presidential elections, collected from the Election Divisions of the
Secretaries of State. Based on this variable, I created another variable to capture
the political homogeneity of readers. It is the absolute distance between the 2004
presidential two party vote-share to John Kerry, and 0.5.
2.2 Measurement of Market Structure
The utilized measure of market competition is the proportion of a political juris-
diction in which the newspaper circulates as a monopoly. In constructing this variable,
I rst classied counties as monopolistic or not monopolistic following the methodology
utilized in Borenstein and Rose (1994). A county was classied as having a monopolistic
structure if a single newspaper had more than 90% of total circulation among news-
papers circulating in the county. A county was classied as not having a monopolistic
structure if no single newspaper accounted for more than 90% of total circulation. To
identify these classes, I used information about newspaper county circulation, available
from ABC.3
The geographical variation of this variable is illustrated for the state of Ohio in
Figure 1. It describes monopolistic counties and the circulation of two local newspapers
that follow an endorsement practice during elections: The Cincinnati Enquirer and The
Plan Dealer. Both newspapers have a higher reader share4 in monopolistic counties.
3For the 658 counties considered, I identied all the operating newspapers and their participation
at that level based on 2005 Audit Bureau circulation data. For the seven states in this study, the
newspaper market is composed of 231 newspapers. Larger newspapers are over-represented in this
sample.




It is possible that newspapers intrinsic characteristics determine their establishment
and/or survival in monopolistic counties, explaining the overall market structure. To
make more general conclusions about these correlations, I ran a probit regression using,
as a dependent variable, an indicator of whether counties are monopolists. Table 1
shows the results. Monopolistic counties are more likely to be politically homogeneous
and have higher income per capita. Consistent with Figure 1, monopolistic counties
are important locations for newspapers as they have a higher reader share in these
counties. As expected, there are less newspapers circulating in monopolistic counties.
Newspapers that circulate in monopolistic counties circulate in more geographical areas
(in more counties).
Table 1: here
2.3 Aggregation at the Newspaper- Political Jurisdiction Level
Endorsement choices are observed at the jurisdiction level. Since newspaper read-
ership characteristics and market competition are only available at the county level,
I aggregated those at the political jurisdiction level. I considered races in which the
county is a subset of an electoral district.
The aggregation rule is a simple (weighted) average of county characteristics across
counties within a jurisdiction. The weights, which are newspaper specic, are the ratio
between a newspapers reader share at the county level and its total reader share at the
political jurisdiction level. They were constructed in the following way: a newspaper
j circulates in a state s, in a jurisdiction d, composed of m counties indexed by u.
Using the information about newspaper county circulation, I calculated the newspa-
per county reader share (RCju),jurisdiction reader share (RDjd)and Weightsjd. Next,
8
I constructed newspaper-jurisdiction characteristics (Xjd) as described below, using











This aggregation was performed for all characteristics (readership and market struc-
ture), for all newspapers, in every political jurisdiction where a newspaper circulates.
In this fashion, I created newspaper-jurisdiction markets and characteristics that I used
to estimate relationships in sections 3 and 4. Note that this simple aggregation rule
generates valuable variation from three facts: (i) for the considered races, a jurisdiction
is composed of several heterogeneous counties; (ii) di¤erent newspapers have di¤erent
reader share in the counties that make up a jurisdiction, and (iii) di¤erent political
jurisdictions are composed of di¤erent counties. The variable of interest in this study
is Monopolistjd. It represents the portion of a political jurisdiction in which the news-
paper operates as a monopolist.
The distribution of this variable is described in Table 2.5 On average, 29.02% of
the newspaper readerships live in monopolist areas within a jurisdiction. The standard
deviation was 0.389. An example of the correlation between likelihood of endorsement
and market competition was observed for the case of The Cincinnati Enquirer. In
2002, it declared its endorsement for the U.S. House race in district 3 (in which 2.7% of
its readership lived in a monopolistic area). Moving 2.05 standard deviations from this
measure was U.S. House District 1 (where 82.5% of its readership lived in a monopolistic
area). For this race, the Cincinnati Enquirer did not make an endorsement.
Table 2: here
Next, I discuss the reasons for some existing relationship between market competi-
5Recall that I assume that the market is composed only by newspapers in the Audit Bureau of
Circulation.
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tion and newspapers likelihood of making endorsements, and then empirically investi-
gate this association.
3 Market Competition and Newspapers Likelihood
of Making Endorsements
Market competition may inuence newspapers characteristics and politicians be-
haviour. These, in turn, can a¤ect newspapers evaluation of candidates and endorse-
ment practices. Market structure can a¤ect newspapers positioning and their political
orientations (Andina-Diaz 2007; Gasper 2009; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). In a
classical study, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) develop a model that combines readers
that hold beliefs they like to see conrmed and prot maximizing newspapers that can
slant stories to cater to readers beliefs. They show that if newspapers face a readership
with heterogeneous views, competition leads to newspapers polarization with respect
to the monopolistic case. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Chiang (2007) provide
tests and nd results conrming this hypothesis: under competition, newspapers tend
to politically di¤erentiate. Since newspapers political orientations (probably) deter-
mine newspapers evaluation of candidates, newspapers may have a higher likelihood
of making endorsements under competition when they are more likely to be extremely
polarized.
Another main channel by which market competition may a¤ect newspapers
decision of making endorsements is by its e¤ects on politicians. Snyder and Stromberg
(2010) provide evidence that incumbents attend to their constituencies needs better in
areas where there is greater newspaper coverage.6 Market structure might be correlated
with media exposure. For example, citizens that live in competitive markets might have
characteristics (such as being more educated or politically well-informed) that make
6They nd that politicians who are less covered by the local press are less likely to serve on
constituency-oriented committees. Also, federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press
coverage of the local members of Congress.
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them more prone to read newspapers. In this case, incumbent quality might respond
to market structure, turning newspapers more likely to make endorsements.
Next, I report the results of probit regressions explaining a newspapers probability
of making an endorsement. The empirical specication is expressed by (1).
yjrt = α + γMonopolistjd + δzjd + βrvr + θj + θr + θt + εjrt (1)
The dependent variable is a dummy of value one if a newspaper j made an en-
dorsement in race r in year t, and zero otherwise. The coe¢cient of interest is γ.
Other characteristics, possibly correlated with the newspapers probability of making
an endorsement, are controlled for. These are zjd, representing newspaper readership
(demographics and political views). Electoral race characteristics are represented by
vr. Newspaper-, electoral race- and year-xed e¤ects are represented by θj, θr, θt, and
εjrt represents a stochastic error term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level
of the 154 races.7
Table 3: here
The results are described in Table 3. Newspapers are more likely to make endorse-
ments in jurisdictions where they operate as a monopoly. This is observed in the raw
data (Column 1) and in regressions controlling for readership and electoral race char-
acteristics (Column 2). In Column 3, I include electoral race xed e¤ects. The size of
the correlation between likelihood of endorsement and the monopolist variable is mag-
nied. This suggests a negative impact from candidates that self-select into running for
election in monopolistic jurisdictions, in inducing newspapers to make endorsements.
The fact that candidates who run for election in races with more market competition
7Noteworthy, the results become weaker, but largely statistically signicant at the 10% level, when
I double cluster at newspaper level and at the race level. They are presented in the Appendix.
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are intrinsically more likely to get endorsed suggests a role of market competition in
politicians behaviour.
Column 4 shows the results with the inclusion of newspaper xed-e¤ects. This
specication is useful to circumvent the fact that a newspapers entry decision in a
market correlates with own characteristics (e.g., larger newspapers might be more likely
to prevent competition), from the e¤ect of competition on newspaper behaviour across
di¤erent electoral markets. The distinction between results in column 3 and 4, can be
explained by a framework, like the one proposed by Mazzeo (2002), of an endogenous
product choice model. He assumes a two-stage model. First, rms with di¤erent types
high and low typesdecide to enter in a market and commit to these entry decisions.
Product types are selected simultaneously in a second stage, allowing a high-type rm to
protably o¤er low-quality services, and behave like a low type.8 It is presumably costly
to gather political information, and newspapers have a limited amount of resources to
allocate to this end. Newspapers that circulate in several electoral markets might
allocate these resources to areas where they face more competition as a way to further
di¤erentiate themselves. In this specication (column 4), the coe¢cient γ becomes
negative and is only statistically signicant at the 10% level.
This reveals two facts. First, the change in the sign of the coe¢cient γ indicates that
newspapers that self-select or determine monopolistic markets are inherently more likely
to make endorsements. This may be because larger newspapers (as shown in section
2.2, newspapers that are more likely to circulate in monopolistic counties also circulate
in more counties) are more likely to survive as they also have more sta¤, resources,
and the reputation to make political endorsements. This resonates with other ndings.
Using county-level data on French local newspapers from 1945-2012, Cage (2013) nds
that markets with more newspapers are associated with fewer newspaper articles and
a lower information provision.
8Mazzeo (2002) assumes that rms make their product choice (e.g., provide political endorsements)
by comparing the payo¤ to operating under each product type alternative, taking into account that
the number of competing rms and their product types will a¤ect the toughness of price competition.
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The second result is related to the negative sign of coe¢cient γ. It suggests that
newspapers also react to market competition as if they are prioritizing in providing
political endorsements in areas where they face more competition. This correlation is
present regardless of candidates that self-select to run for election in these markets,
newspapers reader share, or newspapers intrinsic characteristics (such as their ideo-
logical views or size).
In the next section, I will present a di¤erent and separate analysis to investigate
the impact of newspapers ideological preferences on the likelihood of endorsements.
The kind of candidates running for election can inuence a newspapers choice on
whether to make an endorsement. Partisan papers might derive more gratication
from supporting candidates than non-partisan papers, making themmore likely to make
political recommendations. In order to quantify this e¤ect, I proposed and estimated
a simple structural model that took into consideration the interdependence among
endorsement choices (of whether and whom to endorse) and quantied newspapers
political preferences.
4 A Simple Model of Endorsements
To illustrate the models main features and assumptions, consider the environment
faced by a hypothetical newspaper that is characterized by a political orientation
left-wing, neutral or right-wing. In a general election, the newspaper faces several
simultaneous two-candidate races for which it can make political recommendations.
For any election, the newspaper knows some characteristics of the candidates running
such as the candidates incumbencies and party a¢liations. These characteristics may
a¤ect the newspapers evaluation of candidates, but the newspaper will not yet be fully
informed about other important determinants of its assessment of candidates, such as
competence and political record. Thus, the newspaper has to investigate candidates
records and conduct interviews.9
9Meltzer 2007, Post Crescent 2006.
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Following newspapers description of their practice [The Post Crescent (2006)], I
assume that endorsements are generated from a two-stage decision during a general
election:
• In the rst stage, a newspaper decides in which races to make an endorsement.
It takes into account the research costs and an expected value of endorsing a can-
didate. The endorsement represents the newspapers expressive vote: the value of an
endorsement is determined solely by the newspapers evaluation of the endorsed candi-
date, as opposed to an instrumental model whereby the newspaper seeks to inuence
the election outcome.
• In the second stage, in the newspaper had decided to research candidates, it
becomes fully informed and declares its endorsement.
I next summarize and introduce the notation. A newspaper j has one of three pos-
sible political ideological positions (H ∈ {h1,h2,h3}), which are left-wing (h1), neutral
(h2), and right-wing (h3). In general elections it faces several races e, where two can-
didates c, c ∈ {D,R}, are running for election. For any of these, it potentially makes
two sequential decisions. First, it makes a decision t ∈ {0, 1} to endorse in a race
(t= 1) or not (t= 0). In making this decision, it compares the cost of investigating an
election (and making an endorsement) with the expected value of its announcement.
Second, conditional on endorsing in a race, it can make three types of announcements
i ∈ {D,R,∅},endorse the Democrat (i = D), endorse the Republican (i = R), or
explicitly declare no endorsement for either of the candidates (i = ∅). This last an-
nouncement represents the newspapers abstention in a political race once it determines
that neither of the candidates meets its standards to receive an endorsement.10
From this model, I estimate the following parameters: i) editorial boards valuations
10This assumption is based on evidence from the data. When newspapers declare no endorsement
for either candidate, they justify this choice as due to the low qualications of the candidates. For
example, The Record-Eagle made the following announcement in a race, in the 2006 election: Theres
no good choice in this race. Incumbent Republican Mike Cox has shown hell put politics over policy.
His challenger, Democrat Amos Williams, isnt qualied.
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of candidates characteristics; ii) newspapers costs of making endorsements; and iii) a
probability distribution for newspapers political orientations.
I will next detail the payo¤s and problems for both decisions, starting with the
rst. After describing these components and deriving choice probabilities, I explain the
estimation procedure.
4.1 Decision to Endorse in a Race
In the rst decision, the newspaper faces the choice of whether or not to research the
candidates characteristics, thus to make an informed endorsement in a race. The payo¤
of the newspapers endorsement in a race has two components: its expected benet and






j )− COSTj(RCj) (2)
The rst element, E(ZDj , Z
R
j ) denotes the expected benet of a (future) endorse-
ment. This is the foreseen value of an endorsement and is a function of the ex-ante
observable characteristics of candidates running in a political race, as will be detailed
in the section 4.2. Under the stochastic term assumptions, this expectation has a well-
known closed form derived in Small and Rosen (1981).
E(ZDj , Z
R
j ) = Eε max{S
i∗(H) : i ∈ {D,R,∅}}
= ln((exp(ZD(CANj)) + exp(Z
R(CANj)) + 1))
The endorsement cost, COST conveys both research and reputation costs in making
endorsements. I assumed a simple functional form for this, as described below:
COSTj = β0 + β0  (RCEj) + β0  (RCDj) + β0  (RCMj) + ζ
COST
j (3)
It is determined by a xed endorsement cost common to all newspapers (β0). I then
let the cost vary by newspaper size, reader share in a jurisdiction and election charac-
teristics (RCEj). These characteristics might a¤ect the research cost as they convey,15
respectively, di¤erent levels of paper resources and employees, previous political knowl-
edge of the place and politicians visibility. I allow the cost to vary by readership
demographics and political leanings in a district (RCDj) as these might explain spe-
cialization in a market or di¤erent perceived costs in making endorsements.11 Lastly,
the cost might vary by reader share faced in the jurisdiction (RCMj). The cost vari-
ables are compressed in RCj, where RCj = (RCEj, RCDj, RCMj). These are detailed
in the Appendix. The cost of endorsement is also determined by a research cost shock
ζRESj , assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value distribution.
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The payo¤ of non-endorsing, denoted by NEND, has two components: a deter-
ministic component normalized to zero and a taste shock ζNRESj associated with this




A newspapers rst decision is whether to make an endorsement (t(H) = 1) or
abstain from endorsing (t(H) = 0) in the race, solving the following problem:
Maxt(H)∈{0,1} t(H)[END −NEND]
11In summary, in this setup, I explain newspapers candidate evaluation solely on candidate char-
acteristics, based on the idea that the editorial board is looking to endorse the best candidate. On
the other hand, I use readership characteristics to explain newspapers choice regarding which races
to provide an endorsement. I based this assumption, that may sound overly simple to some reader,
on the classical work of Hamilton (2004, pg. 41). When discussing newspapers costs in producing
and providing news, he describes them as a function of cities and newspapers characteristics, and as
factors that inuenced whether a paper would choose a partisan or non-partisan approach to the news
in providing information during the nineteenth century.
12This component is unobservable to the researcher and reects, for example, a shortage of interns
to collect information about the politicians, or politicians directly contacting newspapers to facilitate
an interview.
13This stochastic term is supposed to explain any remaining di¤erences in the endorsement decisions
of di¤erent newspapers when they face the same research costs. This could be related simply to the
editors mood, for example.
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The probabilities of endorsement (t(H) = 1) and no endorsement (t(H) = 0) are
derived based on integration over ζj and described below:
Pr(t(H) = 1) =
exp(E(CANj)− COST (RCj))
1 + exp(E(CANj)− COST (RCj))
Pr(t(H) = 0) =
1
1 + exp(E(CANj)− COST (RCj))
4.2 Decision of Which Candidate to Endorse
Conditional on having incurred costs in the research process, the newspaper can
make two types of announcement. The rst type favors a candidate. The payo¤ de-
rived from this type of announcement is determined by the newspapers evaluation of
the candidate. It has three components: (i) a deterministic component related to the
newspapers political preference; (ii) a deterministic component unrelated to the news-
papers political preference; and (iii) the newspapers overall evaluation of a candidates
unobservable characteristicssuch as quality, honesty and historical recordrevealed
through research (εDj ,ε
R
j ). These are assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value
distribution. The overall payo¤ from endorsement of a candidate, denoted by Scj , is:
Scj (H, c) = v(H, c) + Z
c(XCj) + ε
c
j, c = {D,R} (4)
Ceteris paribus, left-wing (h1) and right-wing (h3) newspapers give endorsements
for Democrat and Republican candidates respectively, as their most preferred decisions.
This specic party-candidate preference denes newspapers partisan status. Neutral
newspapers are indi¤erent between Democrats or Republicans. The payo¤ v(H, c) that
a newspaper of each type derives from its endorsement of a candidate c, is as follows:
v(h1, c) =

γD, if c = D






0, if c = D




The value of v(H, c) when a newspaper makes its less preferred decision is normalized
to 0. The payo¤ when it makes its preferred decision is γc.
The component unrelated to newspaper political preference, Zc, is a linear function
of two candidate characteristics: if the candidate is an incumbent, represented by an
indicator, and whether there is an ideological alignment between the candidate and
readers in the political jurisdiction. This last variable assumes value 1 if the candi-
date is a Democrat (or Republican) and most of a newspapers readers in the political
jurisdiction voted for John Kerry (or George Bush) in the 2004 presidential election.
It assumes value -1 if the candidate is a Democrat (or Republican) and most of the
readers voted for George Bush (or John Kerry) in the 2004 presidential election.
Besides endorsing the Democrat or Republican, newspapers can explicitly announce
no endorsement for either of the candidates (i = ∅).14 This decisions payo¤ has two
components: (i) a deterministic component that represents the newspapers standard
for making an endorsement where its value is normalized to zero; (ii) newspaper shock
specic to this alternative ε∅j , assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value
distribution.15 The payo¤ of this alternative is:
14I assume that once the newspaper becomes fully informed, it will always make an endorsement
announcement (as is illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix). It is possible that some newspapers
learn about candidates in some races, but the editorial board does not reach a consensus on whom
to endorse and for this reason, they do not make an endorsement (this case is is illustrated in Figure
A2 in the Appendix). This could potentially introduce some positive bias on the estimates for the
costs of endorsements (as newspapers might be more likely to make endorsements than what is as-
sumed) and the valuation of candidate characteristics might be overestimated (as endorsements made
to candidates may occur less frequently than what is assumed among informed newspapers). To check
for robustness, I experimented with a one-stage model that relaxed the assumption that newspapers
make no endorsement when informed (this is an extreme case of the model in Figure A2) and I nd
similar qualitative results to the ones reported in the paper. The results are reported in Table A2 in
the Appendix.
15This component is supposed to capture the unobservable heterogeneity among newspapers within
their standards for declaring an endorsement. If newspapers only care about providing helpful advice
to their readers, they would just need to pick the least worst among the candidates. However, in some
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S∅j (H) = ε
∅
j , for any H
At this (second) stage, the newspaper becomes fully informed and is able to evaluate
the respective payo¤s of the three alternatives. It decides on its announcement i^{*}
according to the rule below:
i∗ = argmax{Si(H) : i ∈ {D,R,∅}}
Integrating the shocks, the probabilities of endorsing a Democrat, a Republican, or
declaring no endorsement for either candidate are respectively:
Pr(i(H) = R) =
exp(ZR(CANj))
1 + exp(ZR(CANj)) + exp(ZD(CANj))
Pr(i(H) = D) =
exp(ZD(CANj))
1 + exp(ZR(CANj)) + exp(ZD(CANj))
Pr(i(H) = ∅) =
1
1 + exp(ZR(CANj)) + exp(ZD(CANj))
4.3 Log Likelihood Function and Estimation Procedure
The likelihood of an endorsement observation for a given race e and a given news-
paper political orientation type is denoted by Lje:
Lje(H) = [Pr(t(H) = 0)]
I(t(H)=0) + [Pr(t(H) = 1)Pr(i(H))]I(t(H)=1)
The probability of newspaper orientation type are derived from logit probabilities,
explained by a constant particular to each type (α1 and α2), as described below:
Pr(h1) =
exp(α1)
1 + exp(α1) + exp(α2)
Pr(h3) =
exp(α2)




1 + exp(α1) + exp(α2)
Multiple endorsement choices are observed for each newspaper. By combining
the sequence of endorsement choices and summing over the possible types of political
orientation, the contribution of a newspaper j is Yj :










The log-likelihood function is then equal to the sum of the log of the individual
contributions Yj, over all newspapers in the sample: K =
P
j ln Yj. The estimated
parameters are the ones that maximize the log-likelihood and are estimated simulta-
neously. The estimated parameters are: i) editorial boards valuations of politicians
characteristics; ii) newspapers costs of making endorsements; and iii) a probability
distribution for newspapers political orientations.
4.4 Results
The estimates for the parameters related to newspapers decisions regarding whether
to make endorsements (from equation 3) are described in Table 4. These are the deter-
minants for newspapers endorsement costs. Because the parameters were measured in
a utility metric, I will focus the interpretation on their sign. Newspapers face lower (or
higher) costs in jurisdictions where they are more (or less) likely to make endorsements.
The results point to the positive cost of making endorsements, as revealed by the sign
of β0 (7.462). Newspapers face di¤erent costs according to the election, readership, and
newspaper characteristics. The cost becomes lower as the share of a newspapers readers
who live in the political jurisdiction increases. This is consistent with the expectation
that newspapers hold more political knowledge and face lower research costs in these
elections. Larger newspapers (those among the 100 largest newspapers in the U.S.)
face lower costs, and therefore are more likely to make endorsements, compared to
other newspapers.
The cost depends on readership race and degree of political homogeneity. Newspa-
pers are more likely (face lower cost) to make endorsements in jurisdictions where there




The estimates for those parameters related to candidates choice (from equation 4)
are described in Table 5. They show that incumbency and ideology are characteristics
positively evaluated by newspapers. Both candidate ideological alignment with newspa-
pers readership and candidate ideological alignment with the newspaper itself explain
the endorsement. However, the estimated parameters indicate that newspapers value
their own ideological preferences more than those of their readers when deciding whom
to endorse.
The coe¢cients γR and γD (in equations 5 and 6) point to an asymmetry between
left-wing and right-wing papers on their valuation of candidates. They suggest that left-
wing newspapers value party alignment more than right-wing newspapers when making
their decision of whom to endorse. This di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 5%
level. This nding is new and has direct implications on the endorsements provided
by newspapers with di¤erent political orientations; on average, right-wing newspapers
should endorse higher-quality candidates.
The model also predicts that newspapers are more likely to be partisan (have a
left-wing or a right-wing orientation) than non-partisan (which have a neutral orienta-
tion), as described in Table 6.16 These results are consistent with the general view of
newspapers as politically biased (Pew Research Centre 2005).
Table 5: here
Table 6: here
16The probabilities are derived from estimated parameters α1 and α2 and the error distribution
assumptions.
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A nice feature of the econometric model is that one can conduct counterfactuals with
the estimated parameters of the model. Table 7 presents the estimated probabilities
of endorsements when newspapers political ideologies are exogenously changed. In the
model, I assumed that partisan newspapers have an extra incentive to make endorse-
ments in comparison to non-partisan papers, insofar as they are supporting candidates
with similar political views.17
A direct implication is that this makes partisan newspapers more likely to incur costs
when making endorsements than non-partisan papers. According to the results, parti-
san papers are at least 25% more likely to make endorsements than non-partisan papers
(Row 1). Consistent with the estimated parameters, left-wing (or right-wing) papers
are more likely to endorse Democrats (or Republicans) than neutral or right-wing (or
left-wing) papers. The implication of these last facts is that most newspapers political
endorsements are politically biased in the sense that they are partially determined by
the newspapers political preferences.
Rows 4-7 provide gures about newspapers trade-o¤s between incumbency and
ideology when deciding whom to endorse. Incumbency is the main determinant of
newspapers endorsements (Ansolabehere et al. 2006.) It reects many candidates
attributes, such as experience, quality and any greater likelihood to win the election.
As shown in Table 7, all types of newspapers were more likely to endorse incumbents
than challengers. However, while non-partisan papers endorsed incumbents at least
eight times more often than challengers, partisan papers endorsed incumbents no more
than three times more often than they endorsed challengers who shared their political
views.
17Data shows that this is a reasonable assumption. The model assumes newspapers make two sequen-
tial choices. However, one can also imagine that newspapers make endorsements without a research
process, using only the information they have at hand. In this case, the newspapers endorsement
decision could be modelled by a logit model. I compared this models predictions with those of a logit
with the same number of control variables. The model achieved a higher log-likelihood value (-813.80)
than the logit (-855.18), and predicted newspapers actual choices with higher success than a logit




This papers aim is to contribute to the discussion on newspapers political be-
haviour by investigating the determinants of newspapers political endorsements. It ex-
plored the variation of endorsements across races and jurisdictions to uncover two main
relationships: (i) the association between the likelihood of endorsements and market
competition and (ii) the association between endorsement decisions and newspapers
political ideologies.
The results show that newspapers likelihood of making endorsements correlates
with market competition, suggesting that market competition makes newspapers more
likely to make endorsements. This relationship survives regression analysis with the
inclusion of newspapers xed e¤ects and jurisdiction reader share. To the best of my
knowledge, this correlation is new. It has implications on how policymakers should
think about the relationship between competition and newspapers partisan behaviour,
including making endorsements.
In the second part of the paper, I provided a simple model for newspapers political
endorsements. Advancing from previous studies, the proposed model endogenizes news-
papers decisions to make any endorsements. It also quanties to what extent partisan
papers are more likely to make endorsements than other papers. The results show that
the size of newspapers preferences for endorsing a party candidate is large, similar to
their preference for endorsing an incumbent. This suggests a possible motivation for
newspapers to make endorsements: a potential desire to inuence election outcomes
and to help elect their favourite candidates. This mechanism has not been covered
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Congressional districts are numbered
Counties where Cincinnati Enquirer
reader share is larger than 10%
Counties where Plain Dealer
reader share is larger than 10%
Counties where Cincinnati Enquirer
reader share is between 0.1-10%
Counties where Plain Dealer





























     
!!	!			     
 !!"#!""	!$%&    
 !!	"#!""	!$%&     
'!"#!""	!$(%
















    
	

  !" #$%  %%
  &'" (( (% $((
  &'")"'*+ (, % %
  !"-	*'+ , ,# 
*+.*'+  %$ (#,
  !")"'*"+ ,#% %# #$#
  &'"-	*+ $ , (
















































( ) ) ) )
				  ) ) )
)*+**	, ) )  
)	*+**	,   ) )
*+**	,!







































	 %# %% !! %!!% %!"

&
 $ $  #$%! $!$ %   

&
	 ! %%    %! "$   

(
	 "$ $#$  $" %%$ #%#"$   

(
' " %%%$   $ %" ""!   

(
  %##   !#$ %"#" %$$   

(












































		 " %$   "# %%! "%#   
/
)	
		 $"$! ""$ %" "$$ !#%
3	
)	




























First Decision variables Description
RCE
βo Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative, and zero otherwise.
βo*Statewide Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in statewide races, and zero otherwise.
βo*Open Race Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in elections the incumbent is not running for re-election, and zero otherwise.
βo*Newspaper readers'share Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative times the newspaper readers' share in the jurisdiction, and zero otherwise.
βo*Top 100 Newspaper Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative if the newspaper is among the largest 100 newspapers in the US.
RCD
βo*Urban Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 47.9% of the newspaper readership lives in urban areas,
 and zero otherwise.
βo*Population Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions if newspaper readership lives in areas with, at least 153,164 habitants,
and zero otherwise.
βo*Income Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where the newspaper readership average income is at least  
 U$ 51,534 and zero otherwise.
βo*Political Homogeneity Index Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative times political homogeneity index.
βo*College Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 16.7% of newspaper readership has a college degree, 
and zero otherwise.
βo*White Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 76.7% of the newspaper readership is 
white, and zero otherwise.
βo*Black Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 5.34% of the newspaper readership is 
black, and zero otherwise.
βo*Hispanic Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 14.61% of the newspaper readership is 
hispanic, and zero otherwise.
βo*Male Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative in jurisdictions where at least 50.03% of the newspaper readership is 
male, and zero otherwise.
RCM
βo*Monopolist Dummy of value one for the Endorsement alternative* fraction of the jurisdiction where the newspaper operates as a monopolist.
Description of Explanatory Variables
2002 2006 2002 2006
Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial
State Attorney State Attorney State Attorney State Attorney
Secretary of State US Senate US House - district 5 US Senate
US House - district 1 US House - district 1 US House - district 6 US House - district 1
US House - district 6 US House - district 2 US House - district 7 US House - district 4
US House - district 8 US House - district 3 US House - district 9 US House - district 5
US House - district 9 US House - district 4 US House - district 13 US House - district 6
US House - district 11 US House - district 5 US House - district 15 State Senate - district 10
US House - district 12 US House - district 6 State Senate - district 12
US House - district 17 US House - district 7 State Senate - district 16
US House - district 18 US House - district 8 State Senate - district 28
US House - district 23 US House - district 9
US House - district 24
US House - district 26
2002 2006 2002 2006
Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial
State Attorney State Attorney State Attorney State Attorney
US Senate US Senate Secretary of State US Senate
US House - district 1 US House - district 1 US House - district 4 US House - district 1
US House - district 2 US House - district 2 US House - district 5 US House - district 2
US House - district 3 US House - district 3 US House - district 6 US House - district 3
US House - district 4 US House - district 4 US House - district 7 US House - district 4
US House - district 6 US House - district 5 US House - district 9 US House - district 5
US House - district 7 US House - district 6 US House - district 10 US House - district 6
US House - district 9 US House - district 7 US House - district 11 US House - district 7
US House - district 10 US House - district 8 US House - district 13 US House - district 8
US House - district 11 US House - district 14
US House - district 12 US House - district 15
US House - district 14 US House - district 17
2002 2006 2002 2006
Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial Gubernatorial
US House - district 1 US House - district 1 State Attorney State Attorney
US House - district 4 US House - district 4 US House - district 3 US Senate
US House - district 5 US House - district 5 US House - district 4 US House - district 1
US House - district 6 US House - district 6 US House - district 5 US House - district 2
State Senate - district 4 State Senate - district 3 US House - district 6 US House - district 3
State Senate - district 7 State Senate - district 4 US House - district 13 US House - district 4
State Senate - district 13 State Senate - district 6 US House - district 24 US House - district 5
State Senate - district 15 State Senate - district 7 US House - district 6
State Senate - district 17 State Senate - district 10 US House - district 7
State Senate - district 19 US House - district 8
State Senate - district 26
2002 2006
Gubernatorial Gubernatorial
State Attorney State Attorney
US Senate US Senate
US House - district 1 US House - district 1
US House - district 2 US House - district 2
US House - district 3 US House - district 3
US House - district 7 US House - district 4
US House - district 8 US House - district 5
US House - district 6
US House - district 7
US House - district 8
List of Elections by State and Year
Oregon Texas
Wisconsin
California Florida
Michigan Ohio
